A similar trend, reaffirming the leading role of the Commission in enforcing EU competition law, expands beyond the area of the electronic communications sector. In the energy sector, in particular, the EC has already encouraged electricity and gas incumbents to adopt structural remedies to address competition concerns on several occasions. By doing so, it went beyond the scope of sector-specific legislation that foresees less invasive, behavioural remedies. Three recent cases of commitments -E.ON 5 , RWE 6 and ENI 7 -go in this direction.
The paper examines the reasoning behind "NRAs' recommended practices defence". It also assesses the incumbents' arguments that they had established their wholesale access prices in line with the guidelines recommended (and, in certain cases, imposed) by their NRAs. Their second line of defence was usually that of recalling the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and fair cooperation between the Commission and individual Member States, arguing that EC decisions had somehow been undermining the unity of the legal system.
It is useful to look at the relevant cases to see the line of reasoning followed by the Commission and the European Courts. The incumbent was found to be dominant in the provision of both wholesale fix telephony network (so called 'local loop') access, and in the downstream market for the provision of retail services to end customers. The retail services included fixed telephony, ISDN and ADSL services. In other words, DT, the provider of wholesale (upstream) services for access to the local loop, was also a direct competitor on the retail market of the purchasers of its services.
II. The Deutsche Telekom case and the influence of the Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi
The European Commission found that DT had abused in two different ways in two different timeframes.
The first abuse consisted in DT charging competitors, from 1998 until 2001, for access to its local network 'more for unbundled access at wholesale level than it charged its own subscribers for access at the retail level'
9 . This margin squeeze practice, consisting in a negative spread between the two sets of charges, was evident and did not required any further costs analysis.
The second form of margin squeeze, put in place from 2002 until the decision was made (May 2003), was more subtle. After 2002, the prices charged to its competitors for wholesale access became lower than the retail subscription prices charged to its own customers, determining a positive spread. However, the Commission found that the positive spread 'was still not sufficient for DT to cover its own product-specific cost for the supply of comparable end-user services' 10 , and still consisted in a margin squeeze practice prohibited by Article 102 TFEU.
The EC decision imposed a fine of EUR 12.6 million for DT abusing its dominant position by way of margin squeeze. DT appealed arguing that its wholesale access prices had been set by the German telecommunications regulatory authority -Regulierungsbehörde für DT's defence partly was based on the argument that the company's management had no margins of discretion in setting its prices. Indeed, under the German regulatory regime, the NRA established a "price-cap" for local loop interconnection rates, rather than a mere regulatory mechanism. Starting from the cost-orientation principle, the incumbent had a margin to fix the price within the threshold of that price cap 13 . DT argued that the Commission should not have intervened to assess whether the "margin" established by DT was infringing competition law principles (in particular, exclusionary practices, as per Art. 102 TFEU) the incumbent stated that since the price-cap had been set by the regulator, DT's pricing policy could not be considered abusive 14 . However the Commission replied that the European Courts "have consistently held that the competition rules may apply where the sector-specific legislation does not preclude the undertakings it governs from engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition. This is particularly so in the case of complaints submitted to the Commission regarding possible violation of the EU competition rules. In such cases the Commission has a duty to investigate, and if necessary to order appropriate remedies" 15 .
The Commission argued that the imposition of regulatory tools does not preclude the undertaking from applying the principles of competition law 16 . Therefore, it focused on demonstrating that there was an evident disproportion between wholesale charges and retail charges for access to the local network. Even though the charges in both cases (wholesale and retail) were subject to sector-specific regulation, DT had commercial discretion which allowed it to restructure its tariffs further so as to "reduce or indeed to put an end to the margin squeeze" 17 . The Commission found that having failed to do so, DT had carried out a practice of margin squeeze constituting the imposition of unfair selling prices within the meaning of Article 102 (a) TFEU. 'Under the German telecommunications charges order, the price cap method is the preferred tariff regulation tool: strict cost orientation is applied to an individual retail service only if that service cannot be allocated to one of the predetermined baskets (39). This means that the firm whose charges are regulated has some discretion to fix its prices on a commercial basis. The price cap system is made up of one price cap decision, laying down the division of services into baskets, the price adjustment guideline and other general terms for a specified period, and other decisions reached on individual applications for adjustments to charges during that price cap period'. 14 Ibid, para 53. 15 Ibid, para 54. 16 under German law, all its retail prices had to be examined and approved in advance by RegTP The CFI acknowledged therefore that it was first necessary to look at the applicable national legislation to see whether that legislation gave the incumbent any room for manoeuvre 35 .
The CFI arrived at the conclusion that 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid, para 88. 30 Emphasis added. 31 Furthermore, the CFI found that DT had a margin of discretion at least with respect to the setting of retail prices in such a way as to avoid engaging in margin squeeze. At para 131, the CFI expressly points out that the incumbent did not use the discretion at its disposal so as to secure an increase in its retail prices, which would have helped to reduce the margin squeeze in the period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2001. On the contrary, DT used that discretion to even further lower its retail prices in respect of ISDN lines during that period" 37 .
The CFI confirmed therefore the findings of the EC, reaffirming that the German incumbent had indeed abused its dominant position, within the margin of discretion which it still had, within the thresholds (price caps) set by the German regulator.
The DT judgment stressed also the negative effects of the contested practice on the communications market as a whole, saying that margin squeeze "will in principle hinder the growth of competition in the downstream markets. If the applicant's retail prices are lower than its wholesale charges, or if the spread between the applicant's wholesale and retail charges is insufficient to enable an equally efficient operator to cover its product-specific costs of supplying retail access services, a potential competitor who is just as efficient as [DT] would not be able to enter the retail access services market without suffering losses" 38 .
In response to DT's claims, the CFI replied that the practice of the European judiciary The CFI argued therefore that it had first to ascertain whether the "German legal framework" 36 Ibid, para 120. 37 Ibid, para 31. 38 CFI judgment, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, para 237. Emphasis added. 39 Ibid, para 86 ff. 40 Ibid, para 89.
(including also the rules set out by the telecom regulator) would have left some margin of discretion to the undertaking or not 41 .
DT went further in its defence claiming that the German NRA was obliged, according to national law, to verify and examine the conformity of the requested adjustment of charges "with The CFI stressed also how the same NRA found that "the competitors are not so prejudiced with regard to their competitive opportunities 45 in the local network by the slight difference between retail and wholesale prices at to make it economically impossible for them to enter the market successfully or even to remain in the market". It thus somehow confirmed that it was not only DT, but also the German telecoms regulator, that were not fully aware of the anticompetitive consequences of DT's conducts within a theoretically complete legal framework of tariffs designed by that very regulator 46 .
In its judgment, the CFI had also to look whether the Commission "has established to the requisite legal standard in the contested decision that the applicant has sufficient scope in the ECR 3461, para 57, where it stresses that the dominant undertakings have a special responsibility not to allow their conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market. 54 Ibid, para 84. 55 Ibid, para 91 (emphasis added).
access prices) does not per se preclude the possibility that the incumbent will be fined by the competition authority (Commission). The Telefónica decision relates to the abuse of a dominant position carried out by way of margin squeeze over a significant period of time (five years) with respect to the wholesale broadband access market at the national and regional level (not a local loop unbundling case).
III. The position of European Courts in the
The incumbent charged high broadband access rates to its competitors, keeping the access rate very low for its own retail broadband access services, and thus forcing competitors out of the market. This conduct not only damaged competitors in the long term (leading to the severe fine) but also hindered many companies from entering the market, consequently excluding final consumers from having access to broadband services 57 .
The Commission pointed out that unless competitors decided to create an alternative network, which was not viable economically, they had no other choice but to deal with the incumbent to get access to its ADSL enabled local loops in order to provide DSL access services 58 . The decision noted that from 2002 onwards, the Spanish regulator mandated wholesale access to the incumbent's network at national and regional level in favour of competitors (paragraphs 289-290). Access rates were set applying the so-called retail minus 58 See para 74 of the decision: "An undertaking wishing to provide broadband access to the end-users throughout the Spanish territory has no other option, save the economically not viable roll-out of an alternative nation-wide access network, but to contract one of the wholesale ADSL services available on the market, which are all built on TESAU's access network consisting of ADSL enabled local loops". The GC dismissed an appeal against the Telefónica decision in March 2012 65 . In its judgment, the GC rejected the claim submitted by the incumbent that the Commission (i) had not taken into consideration that the infringement was committed in part through simple negligence by Telefónica, or (ii) had considered its negligence as "extremely serious". The GC 59 Under the retail-minus system, the wholesale access charge is set at the vertically-integrated operator's retail price minus the incremental cost of providing downstream services and any network elements supplied by the access seeker. See W.J. Baumol-J.G. Sidak, under the regulatory framework" 87 .
81 AG Wathelet, Opinion, para 41. 82 Ibid, para 55. 83 Ibid, para 175. 84 CJ judgment, Case C-295/12 Telefonica and Telefonica Espana v Commission, 10 July 2014. The judgment is not yet published, but is accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0295. 85 Ibid, para 132. 86 Clear on this point is para 128 of the CJ's judgment of 10 July 2014: "It should be recalled in that regard that Article 102 TFEU is of general application and cannot be restricted, inter alia, as the General Court was correct to point out at paragraph 293 of the judgment under appeal, by the existence of a regulatory framework adopted by the EU legislature for ex ante regulation of the telecommunications markets". 87 CJ judgment, Case C-295/12, Telefonica and Telefonica Espana v Commission, para 134.
"it is, in part, inadmissible, in so far as it alleges distortion of the appellants' arguments, since the appellants fail to identify the arguments which they claim the General Court distorted and, in part, unfounded, in so far as it alleges breach of the principle of subsidiarity, since the Commission's implementation of Article 102 TFEU is not subject to any prior consideration of action taken by national authorities" 88 .
This point confirms the approach of European Courts vis à vis the role of the Commission with respect to the conduct of dominant undertakings as far as they allege that they have followed the guidelines of NRAs, without being left with a margin of doubt. The case is relevant because the Commission, somehow departing from its own Guidance Paper, stressed that margin squeeze has to be considered harmful for consumers without passing through the "refusal to supply test", irrespective of whether the abusive practice is carried out in the presence of a pre-existing duty to deal. As stressed earlier, the Guidance Paper considered conduct in the form of margin squeeze under the heading "refusal 88 Ibid, para 135 (emphasis added). particular market has a duty to supply access to an essential facility.
The CJ confirmed its concern for final consumers, irrespective of the existence of all the pre-conditions that were considered fundamental in the Commission's Guidance Paper, in line with existing and well-settled jurisprudence. The CJ stresses in TeliaSonera how "the fact that a vertically integrated undertaking, holding a dominant position on the wholesale market in asymmetric digital subscriber line input services, applies a pricing practice of such a kind that the spread between the prices applied on that market and those applied in the retail market for broadband connection services to end users is not sufficient to cover the specific costs which that undertaking must incur in order to gain access to that retail market may constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU" 91 .
More importantly, the CJ underlined that any circumstances may be useful to determine whether margin squeeze is abusive, but certainly "it is necessary to demonstrate that, taking particular account of whether the wholesale product is indispensable, that practice produces an anti-competitive effect, at least potentially, on the retail market, and that the practice is not in any way economically justified" 92 .
The analysis of these two further cases shows that the doctrine expressed by the CIF case in 2003 is still applicable. The rationale behind that judgment, given at the dawn of the so called "great enlargement" of the European Union, was that of acknowledging the power , pp 273-274. Nazzini notes that AG Mazák suggested a different approach, with respect to refusal to supply, in particular (i) to look at the margin squeeze as a form of vertical foreclosure tactic similar to that carried out by refusal to supply, (ii) to take into consideration the risk that if there is not a duty to deal, "to impose a duty to charge upstream and downstream prices that allow as efficient downstream firms to compete effectively would reduce the dominant undertaking's investment incentives" and, most interestingly (iii) to take into consideration an "a fortiori", a very subtle, argument: if the duty to deal is not a pre-condition, and the company in theory could refuse to supply, "why can it not harm them by charging upstream and downstream prices that make it difficult for them to compete?" (R. Nazzini, cited, p 274 government and of the incumbent operator, the Commission's ability to use competition law to oversee the markets is necessary to ensure that markets are liberalised and incumbents are not protected by regulators" 94 . However, he also argued that the power of the EC and the application of competition law, in particular when NRAs act according to normative schemes set up by EU law in regulated sectors, should encounter a reasonable limit in line with a wider interpretation of the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, legal certainty and loyal cooperation (all principles recalled by Telefónica's lawyers in the CFI appeal). Indeed, for G.
Monti, there might be circumstances in which the Commission should be more "deferential"
to the regulators, in particular when reasons of public interest may suggest that actions undertaken or proposed by the regulators may turn to be more apt to address long-term concerns, as for instance, the imperative of ensuring stable growth and innovation 95 .
The Italian NCA had adopted a more cautious approach, arguing that in principle the investigated company could have acted against the general principles of competition law since national legislation "authorised" it. By contrast, the CJ was adamant in saying that the duty of the NCA to neutralise national legislation contradicting EU law provisions, was in line with the general principle of the primacy of European Law 96 . The European judiciary here drew a line between breaches of competition law before the date of the adoption of the NCA's decision, and breaches committed after that date. The need to preserve legal certainty for the Court led to a conservative interpretative approach of the conducts put in place before the NCA's decision, therefore excluding the imposition of administrative or criminal sanctions for conducts imposed by national legislation.
To quote P. Nebbia, "the law continues to constitute, for the period prior to the decision to disapply it, a shield for the undertaking concerned against all the consequences of an infringement of Article 81 and /or 82 [now Art. 101 and 102 TFEU] vis-à-vis both public authorities and other economic operators" 97 . Of course once the NCA had adopted a decision (with definitive effects) imposing the disapplication of national, anticompetitive provisions, from that moment on "the 'shield' no longer protects them for future infringements: their future conduct is therefore liable to be penalized" 98 .
The approach of the Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica margin squeeze cases is slightly different, but reaches a similar conclusion.
The most important inference emerging from the analysis of these two cases is that when national legislation (and provisions of NRAs) sets prices as guidelines to be followed by undertakings in a dominant position, the competition authority (and, a fortiori, the Commission) will look at the nature of those provisions more than at the position adopted by the NCA with respect to those provisions. The NCA and the Commission will look whether the provision imposes or merely facilitates anticompetitive conducts that the dominant undertaking can modify in order to avoid exclusionary anti-competitive conducts.
It is worth recalling here also the conclusions reached by the CIF judgment. If a (past) national provision imposed a specific conduct (in this case, prices-cap), the competition authority "may not impose penalties in respect of past conduct on the undertakings concerned European competition law over regulatory activity, also in terms of remedies (behavioural as well as structural) that can be adopted to create a "level playing field" for competition.
Reference to the recent E.ON 102 , RWE 103 and ENI 104 commitments decisions is selfexplanatory here where the EC accepted commitments meant to adopt structural measures going beyond the scope of European and national legislation authorising mere behavioural remedies to enhance competitiveness. He stressed how it may happen that regulators (for instance, in the energy sector, but similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to communications) may have insufficient competencies or independence. By contrast, competition law could be more efficient, applied faster and with stronger investigative powers.
The most important consequence from this reasoning, in favour of the supremacy of competition enforcement over the activities of NRAs, is that the Commission can also use the tools established by Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. Hence, not only fines or behavioural remedies, but also structural remedies would be applicable under EU law.
This approach shows the centrality and the guidance role played by the Commission, not only in detecting abusive conducts and imposing fines even where provisions adopted by national regulators may theoretically justify the conducts put in place by the incumbent, but also in choosing remedies, such as structural divestitures, going beyond the provisions contained in the existing regulatory framework.
V. Conclusion
The analysed judgments have confirmed the unity of the European legal system over the last decade, through the joint actions of the European Commission, NCAs and European
Courts. This is true, in particular, in regulated markets such as electronic communications, though the same conclusion can be reached with respect to energy markets. With respect to the latter, the EC has adopted pro-competitive remedies in a number of commitments decisions already (E.ON, RWE and ENI) that go beyond existing regulatory provisions. It has shown that when the enforcement authority is called to recreate a pro-competitive environment, it has a wider "room of manoeuvre" at remedial level than the same regulatory provisions, both at European and national level. 
